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was approved, and the present Chief Justice stated the rule
almost in the very words used above, that an institution claiming exemption from taxation, as a public charity, should be
"free from any element of private or corporate gain."
How any one can say that this element is not to be found
in the Fire Insurance Patrol Company, is difficult to perceive.
Philadelphia.

JOHN MARSHALL GEST.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
STATE EX REL. WORRAL v. PEELLE.
The Legislature possesses only such power as the people have delegated to it by
the Constitution. A written Constitution is a limitation upon the power of government in the hands of the Legislature.
The Legislature has no power to create a general State office and fill it by election, unless especially empowered so to do by the Constitution.
A clause in the Constitution, that "All officers, whose appointments are not
provided for in this Constitution, shall be chosen in such manner as now is or
hereafter may be prescribed by law," does not of itself empower the Legi=lature to
elect or appoint a general State officer.
The right to fill vacancies by appointment in all State offices of a general character, is vested in the Governor.
The electors of the State have a right, of which they cannot be deprived, to fi1l
all State offices of a general character, by election.
The attempt of the Legislature to fill an o.iice newly created, by election, being
void, the Governor may disregard such attempt and fill the vacancy by appointment.

Harris, Beveridge and Itichener, Attorney-General, for appellant.
31cCullougs & Harlan for appellee.
OLDS, J., November 7, 1889. The relator filed his information to obtain possession of the office of Chief of the Indiana
Bureau of Statistics, to which office he claimed to have been
duly appointed by the Governor of the State, and for the removal of the defendant, William A. Peelle, Jr., who, it is alleged, had usurped and illegally continued to hold such office.
The defendant demurred to the information in the Court below, stating two causes of demurrer: First,that the complainant does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action; Second, that the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue.
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The Court sustained the demurrer, to which ruling the plaintiff excepted at the time, and elected to stand on the information as filed, whereupon the Court rendered judgment for the
defendant' From this judgment the plaintiff appeals, and
assigns as error the ruling of the Court in sustaining the demurrer to the information.
It is contended by counsel for the appellee that notwithstanding the relator may be entitled to the office, and the
defendant has usurped and continues to illegally hold it, the
information does not state facts sufficient to entitle the relator
to the relief asked, and that the demurrer was rightfully sustained. This question we have considered, and think the information not subject to the objections urged to it, and that it
is sufficient. It alleges facts showing the date of appellant's
appointment, that there was at the time a vacancy in the office,
that the relator was duly appointed by the Governor of the
State, and that he is eligible to the office, that the defendant
had usurped and illegally held it, and states that he made a
demand for the possession of the office.
This brings us to the consideration of the chief and leading
questions in the case. The Legislature of the State in 1879
passed an Act creating a Department of Statistics, and the
first section of the Act, R. S. i88i, Section 5717, declared the
purpose of the Act to be "for the collection and dissemination of information hereinafter provided, by annual reports
made to the Governor and Legislature of the State." The
second section provided for the appointment of a chief, and is
as follows"The Govo-nor ig hereby authorized to appoint, as soon after the passage of

this act as convenient,'and thereafter, biennially, some suitable person to act as
chief, who shall have power to employ such assistants as lie may deem necessary,
and said officer and assistants shall constitute the Indiana Bureau of Statistics,

with headquarters to be furnished by the State."

Section Three prescribed the duties of the bureau as follows-"The duties of said bureau shall be to collect, systematize, tabulate and present, in annual reports, as hereinafter provided, statistical information and details
relating to agricultural, manufacturing, mining, commerce, education, labor, social
and sanitary conditions, vital statistics, marriages and deaths, and to the permanent prosperity of the productive industry of the people of the State."
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Section Four made it the duty of all persons, officers and
corporations to give and furnish information on blanks and to
answer to questions relating to the duties of the bureau. The
act provided for the salary of the chief, and prescribed penalties for failures to give information.
By an Act passed in 1883 (Elliot Sup., Sec. 1852), Section
Two of the Act of 1879 was amended, and the amended
section made it the duty of the two houses of the General
Assembly, in joint convention, to select at its regular biennial
sessions its chief, and, in case of vacancy in the office by
death, resignation or dismissal, the Governor should supply
the vacancy by appointment, and provided that the first
election of such chief should be held on the taking effect of
the Act.
In 1889, the Legislature passed an additional Act relating to
such Bureau of Statistics, by which they imposed additional
duties on the chief of the bureau. Section One provided
that, in addition to the other duties now imposed by law on
the Chief of the Indiana Bureau of Statistics, he shall collect, compile and systematize statistics with reference to the
subject of labor, as to social, educational, industrial and general conditions, wages and treatment of all classes of our working people, to the end that the effect of the same may be
shown, and shall report to the Legislature, in convenient form,
the results of his investigation. Section Two provided that
the duties of such bureau shall be to collect, in the manner
hereinafter provided, assort, systematize, print and present
biennial reports to the Legislature, of statistical details relating to all departments of labor in this State, including the
penal institutions thereof, particularly concerning the hours of
labor and mechanics employed, the number of apprentices in
each trade, with the nativity of such laborers, mechanics and
apprentices, wages earned, savings from the same, the culture,
moral and mental, with age and sex of persons employed, the
number and character of accidents, the sanitary condition of
institutions where labor is employed, as well as the influence
of the several kinds of labor and the use of intoxicating liquors
upon the health and mental condition of the laborers, the restrictions, if any, put upon apprentices when indentured, the
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proportion of married laborers and mechanics who live in
rented houses, with the average annual rental of the same, the
average members of the families of married laborers and mechanics, the value of property owned by laborers or mechanics,
if foreign-born, upon their arrival in this country, and the
length of time they have resided here, together with all other
matter pertaining to the subject. Section Three authorized
the chief and deputy to examine witnesses, and gave them
power to compel persons to produce and give the information
desired. Section Four prescribed penalties for a refusal to
furnish information and answer questions asked by the chief
and his deputy. Section Five authorized the employment of
a deputy by the chief at a salary of $1,ooo per annum, and the
employment of other assistants. Section Six appropriated
$5,000 additional pef annum to carry out the provisions of the
,Act Section Seven allowed the chief $6oo additional salary,
making in all $i,8oq per annum. By Section Eight it is made
the duty of the chief to transmit immediately on publication,
-one copy of the biennial report of the bureau to each county
and State officer in Indiana.
It is contended on the part of the appellant that the Chief
.of the Indiana Bureau of Statistics is a State officer, and that
the law is unconstitutional in so far as it provides for the election of such officer by the General Assembly, and that the
election held by the General Assembly, at which the appellee
was elected, was illegal and void and gave the appellee no title
to the office, and that there was a vacancy in such office at.the
time the relator was appointed, which the Governor had the
right to fill by appointment, which he did by the appointment
of the relator, Worral. On the other hand, it is contended by
the appellee thatit is a legislative office, which the General
Assembly had a right to fill by election, as prescribed by the
law, and that although it may not be a legislative office, and is,
in fact, a State office, yet the General Assembly had the right
to fill such -office by an election as provided for by the Act of
1883 ; that the Legislature has the right to create a State office
and prescribe by law that the General Assembly shall elect
such officer.
It is admitted, and must be, that the Legislature of the State
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may exercise appointing power and select officers t6 fill the
various offices which are peculiarly related to and connected
with the exercise of its Constitutional functions and such as are
necessary for it to appoint to maintain its independent existence, and this we think the limit of the appointing power of the
Legislature, unless additional power has been given by the express provisions of the Constitution, or acquired by construction under the rules of practical exposition. We have therefore set forth in detail the provisions of the various acts relating to the object of creating the Indiana Bureau of Statistics,
and the duties and powers of the chief of such bureau, and
from such provisions we are to determine whether or not
such office is one which the Legislature has the right to elect.
It is contended by counsel for appellee that the object of the
bureau is for the purpose of having collected and systematized
such facts pertaining to labor and kindred subjects as might
become important to direct the General Assembly in enacting
wise legislation, and to that end they may require that the chief
of such bureau shall make a full and complete detailed report of
his investigations to them, and that he shall make such recommendations with reference thereto as he may deem proper.
We cannot agree with this theory. The first section of the Act
of 1879 provides that the chief shall report both to the Governor and the Legislature, and that section has not been
amended or repealed, and is still in force. The Act of 1889
makes it the duty of the chief to send one copy of his report,
as soon as printed, to each county and State officer. If we are
to limit the object and purpose of the bureau to furnishing information to those to whom the chief is to report or furnish
copies of the report; the object is as much to furnish information for the Governor and other individual State and county
officers of the State as to furnish information to the Legislature, for they are each and all to be furnished with a report
and the information it-contains.
We think the object and purpose of creating the bureau and
putting an officer at its head is much broader than that contended for by counsel for appellee. It is to gather and systematize statistical information and details relating to agriculture, manufacturing, mining, commerce, education, labor, so-
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cial and sanitary conditions, vital statistics, marriages and
deaths, and the prosperity and productive industry of the people of the State; that all the people of the State may know
the facts gathered relating to the resources of the State, the
condition of its laborers, its social and sanitary conditions, and
as to the education and prosperity of its citizens, for the good
of the people of the State, and the development of its industries and good of its citizens. To this end the reports are required to be distributed so as to be accessible to all, and not
only that it may be *known, and the information furnished to
every citizen of the State, but that the people of other States
and the world may know in reference to the products of the
State, and of our mining, manufacturing and educational interests, the condition of our laborers, and our social and sanitary
conditions. To this end it is provided for a liberal distribution
of the reports of the chief, that one may be placed in the hands
of every State and couhty officer. When the people are put
in possession of this information, the legislators, who are of
the people, elected by and come from the people at frequent
intervals, are possessed'of this information, and prepared to direct wise legislation. When all the people are possessed of
this information, it is far better than if but the legislators were
informed of it. If the information disclosed such a state of facts
as that suggested, and required legislation, it would provoke
discussion as to the proper legislation to remedy any evil which
might exist within the State. Remedies would be suggested
and legislators selected whose views corresponded with the
views of the majority, and thus the will of the majority of the
people of the State would be expressed by a law prescribing
a remedy for the evil, if one existed, or the betterment of the
people, or development of the industries of the State.
Fortunately, in passing upon this question, we are not left
to our own views alone in determining the question as to
whether this is a legislative office or not, with the Legislature
claiming it as such and the Governor den)'ing that it is, for we
have evidence in the law itself that the Legislature which enacted the first Act upon the subject creating the bureau, and
providing for a chief, did not regard it as a legislative office.
The Act of 1879 provided that the Governor should appoint
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the chief; therefore, we think it must be conceded that the
Legislature creating the office did not regard it as a legislative
office. If it had been so regarded by that Legislature it would
have elected the officer. Certainly the Legislative Department
would not call upon another department of the State Government to appoint or elect an officer that was within its prerogative to elect. Indeed, it seems to us that there can be no
reasonable doubt on the question of the nature of the office.
The information to be gathered is for the benefit of the whole
people of the State, the duties of the office relate to and affect
all the people of the State; the officer is given power to inquire into the business, the finances and social relations of all
the people; he is given almost unlimited power to inquire into
nearly all matters affecting the interest of the people, and may
compel all to answer his questions and furnish the information
desired; the officer's salary is paid out of the general finds of
the State, and appropriations are made from the general funds
to pay the expense of gathering the information. The officer
is no way connected with the exercise of legislative functions;
nor is his appointment necessary for the purpose of the Legislature in maintaining independent existence; nor has the Legislature acquired the right to appoint such officer by a construction of the Constitution, under the rule of practical
exposition. In view of the object of the law and the nature of
the office, it is unquestionably a State office, and we find upon
examination of the laws of other States, that offices of this
character are not regarded by the Legislatu'es of other States
as in any sense legislative offices coming within the prerogative
of the Legislature to elect the officers.
Having reached this conclusion, the next question for determination is the right of the Legislature under the Constitution to create a State office and fill it by the General Assembly electing the officer. This brings us to the consideration
of the power of the General Assembly. This must be determined by some general principles. Judge Cooley, in his work
on Constitutional Limitations, fifth edition, p. 37 (* 28), says",
The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the
people, from whom springs all legitimate authority."
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Story, in his work on the Constitution (Section 208), says"The State, by which we mean the people comprising the State, may divide its
sovereign powers among various functionaries, and each, in the limited sense, would
be sovereign in respect to the powers confided to each, and dependent in all other
cases. Strictly speaking, in our republican form of government the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation, and the residuary sovereignty of
each State not granted to any of its public functionaries, is in the people of the
State."

Judge Cooley, in the same work, on p. 47 (* 36), says"In considering State Constitutions, we must not commit the mistake of supposing that because individual rights are guarded and protected by them, they must
also be considered as owing their origin to them. These' instruments measure the
power of the rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed."

Again, on the same page (* 37), he says"It grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power--the instrument of their convenience."

And, again, he says" A written Constitution is in every instance a limitation upon the powers of
government in the hands of agents, for there never .was a written republican Constitution which delegated to functionaries all the latent powers, which lie dormant
in every nation, and are boundless in extent and incapable of definition."

On page 208 of the same work Judge Cooley says:,, It does not follow, however, that in every case, the courts, before they can set
aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in the Constitution some specific inhibition which has been disregarded, or some express command which has been disobeyed. Prohibitions are only important when they are in the nature of a general grant of power, and if the authority to do an act has not been granted by the
sovereign to its representative it cannot be necessary to prohibit its being done."

From these general and well-settled principles, laid down
by Judges Cooley and Story, there logically flows, and they
inevitably and conclusively establish the principle, that before
the adoption of the Constitution and delegating power to the
various departments of Government, there existed in the sovereign, the people of the State, all power, including the right to
elect their own officers and rulers, and unless they delegated the
power to create an office and elect the officer to some department of the State Government, that power still rests with the
people, and the right to create the office is one thing and the
right to elect the officer another; and if they have delegated
power to create the office and not to elect the officer they (the
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people) still have the right to elect. It is conceded that the
right to create the office is delegated to the Legislature, and we
need not consider that question. It is denied by the appellant
that the General Assembly has the right to elect a State officer,
and it is contended that the Governor has the right to appoint,
at least when there is a vacancy, and that there was a vacancy in
this case. On the other hand, it is contended by the appellee
that the General Assembly has the right to elect a State officer,
and that such power is conferred by Section i, Article 15, of
the State Constitution, which is as follows"All officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Constitution
shall be chosen in such manner as now is or hereafter may be prescribed by law."

If such power is conferred at all, it is by this section, and
we need not consider any other section or clause of the Constitution except such as is necessary to aid in the interpretation and construction of this section. A construction has
been given to this section of the Constitution adversely to the
theory of counsel for the appellee by decisions of this Court, in
which a majority of the judges of the Court concurred: The
State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, Mayor (1889), I18 Ind. 382 ;
The City of Evansville v. The State ex rel.Blend et al. (1889),
Id. 426; The State ex rel.Holt v. Denny, Mayor (1889), Id.449.
It was held that giving the Legislature power to prescribe by
law the manner of electing an officer does not confer the power
to elect, and that there is a manifest distinction between providing the mode of doing a thing and doing a thing itself.
These opinions are supported by the cases of the State v. Kennon et al. (1857), 7 Ohio St. 546, and Jones v.Perry (1836), io
Yerg. (Tenn.) 59. The conclusions reached in these cases, we
think, are correct, and give the proper construction to this section of the Constitution.
In this connection it is right to consider and determine what
is the proper method of electing State officers, and who have
the right to elect. It will be seen by reference to the old Constitution, that Representatives and Senators were elected by
the people; also county and township officers, and the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor were elected by the people. All
other State executive officers were elected by joint vote of both
houses of the General Assembly, as were, also, the president
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and judges of the Circuit Courts. The judges of the Supreme
Court were appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice
of the Senate, and they appointed the clerk of this Court. [R.
S. 1843, PP. 97, 100, ioI and 102.]

The Constitution also

provided for the election of other officers by the vote of both
houses.
By the new Constitution, the people changed the system of
electing State officers, so as to revest in the people of the State
at large the right to vote for and elect all administrative State
officers prescribed for in the Constitution, and all the judges
and clerk of the Supreme Court, and also. provided for the
election of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. In the
first article and first section of the new Constitution, they claim
that all power is inherent in the people. By Section i, Article
3, they divide the powers of the Government in three separate
departments-the Legislative, the Executive, including the
Administrative, and the Judicial-and declare and say that no
person charged with official duties under one of these departments shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as
in this Constitution expressly provided. By Section i, Article
4, it is declared that the legislative authority of the State shall
be vested in the General Assembly, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives, and by Section i6, same
article, it is declared that each house shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the legislative department of a free
and independent State. This is all the general power granted
to this department, and it is nowhere provided in what manner
an officer, to fill an office created by law, shall be elected. The
Constitution, by its terms, declares and vests the executive
power of the State in the Governor, and it specifically authorizes the Governor to fill vacancies in State offices.
There is no provision in the Constitution declaring by whom
a State officer shall be chosen or elected to a State office
created by law. It seems manifest by the change made in the
Constitution, taking away the power granted by the old Constitution to the General Assembly to elect State officers, the
people retaitiing the power to elect all State officers created by
the new Constitution, and granting to no department of Government the right to elect officers to fill the State offices which
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might thereafter be created by law, that one of the principal
objects in revising the Constitution was to take from the legis'lative and executive departments of the Government, all power
to fill State offices by the appointment or election of such officers. In the Constitutional Debates, Vol. 2, p. 138, we find
Mr. lhnan, who was a member of the Convention, saying
in a speech" It will 1ierecollected that we do not intend to confer upon the l.egislature the
powe.r .,fappointing.

There may pos~i1ly be two or three otficer,, the appoint-

nwnt of which will be vested in the I.egiblature."

And nowhere do we find the assertion controverted. We
also find in the address issued by that Convention to the electors
of the State, setting forth the changes proposed, a statement
that- The Secretary of the State, Auditor of State and Treasurer of State, who were
ticeted under the old Con-titution by the L.cgi.lature, are now elected by the
leolole.'"

There is also the following statement in regard to the election of judges"The Supreme and Circuit Judges heretofore cho-en, the firmer by appointment
of the G overnor, confirmed by the Senate, and the latter by joint vote of both
house-, are, by the new Constitution, to lieelected by the peolle." and it i stated
:hat "there is to be elected by the people a proaecuting attorney for each judicial

Circuit."

It seems to be evident that if the office now under consideration had been created by the Constitution, the mode of electing the officer would have been declared to be by election by
the people. No greater reasons exist why the Secretary of
State or the Superintendent of Public Instruction should
be elected by the people, than the Chief of the Bureau
of Statistics. The conclusion we unhesitatingly reach is, that,
Linder the new Constitution, which took effect November i,
185 I, the power to elect State officers whose duties are general,
and such are the duties of the Chief of the Indiana Bureau of
Statistics, remains with the people, and that the proper interpretation and construction to be given Section i, Article 15, is
that State officers shall be chosen by the electors of the State
in such manner as may be prescribed by law, and that it is the
duty of the Legislature, in creating a State officer, to fix the
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term of the office and provide for the election of the officer by
the people.
On examination we find the construction we have given the
Constitution supported by the practical interpretation given to
it until within a very recent date. Soon after the adoption of
the Constitution, the office of Attorney-General was created,
and it was provided by law that the officer should be elected
by the electors of the State. True, the Act provided that the
General Assembly should elect to fill the vacancy existing
until an election by the people, but the General Assembly adjourned without holding an election and electing such officer,
as the Act provided. The fair inference is, that on more mature deliberation, after the passage of the Act, they determined
that they had no power to elect, and hence adjourned without
doing so.
The Constitution provides that the General Assembly shall
provide by law for the speedy publication of the decisions
of the Supreme Court (Sec. 6, Art. 7), and immediately after
the adoption of the Constitution, the Legislature created the
office of Reporter of the Supreme Court, and provided for
the election of the Reporter by the people. Likewise, district
officers were created, Courts of Common Pleas were established,
and the offices of judges of the Courts of Common Pleas and
district prosecuting attorneys were created, and it was provided
by law that the judges and prosecutors should be elected by
the electors of the respective districts. Without setting out
the various provisions in the Constitution vesting appointing
power in the Governor of the State, it is our conclusion that
the right to fill the vacancies in all such offices is vested in the
Governor, the executive officer of the State.
It follows, therefore, that the Act of 1883, amending Section
2 of the Act of 1879, providing for the election of the Chief of
the Indiana Bureau of Statistics by the General Assembly, is
unconstitutional and void, and the Act of 1879, attempted to
be-amended, is still in force. Section 2 of the Act of i879
provides that the Governor shall appoint the chief In so far
as it provides for the appointment by the Governor, it is simply
declaratory of the Constitution and gives to the Governor no
power that he did not possess by virtue of the Constitution, as
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by it he held power to fill the vacancy until an election by the
people, and the Legislature could give the Governor no greater
authority, but this section is valid and operates to fix the tenure
of the office. The force and effect of this section is to fix the
tenure of the office at two years: American and English
Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, p. 674, note i; Newland v. -11ars/i(1857),
19 Ill. 376; The Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County (1866),
21

Iowa

221.

Though the law creating the office in question does not provide for the election of the officer by the people, and is silent
on that subject, and there is no provision of the statute relating
to and providing for the election of this particular officer, yet
we think the law creates the office, and when created, the people have the right to elect the officer. It would seem that they
would have that right, and might elect such officer at a general
State election, even if there was no statute in force governing
general elections that contemplated the election of such officer.
The people cannot be deprived of the right to elect an officer,
by the neglect or refusal of the Legislature to discharge its
duty. But we are not called upon to decide that question, as
the general election law clearly authorizes the election of such
officers. Sec. 4678, Rev. Stat., I88I, reads as follows",
A general election shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
November, in the year 1882, and biennially thereafter on the same day, at which
election allexisting vacancies in office, and alloffices, the terms of which will
expire before the next general election thereafter, shall be filled, unless otherwise
provided by law."

This statute is broad enough, and it was intended to fill all
offices which would become vacant before the next general
election. The appointee of the Governor would hold until his
successor was elected at the next general election after he was
appointed and until his successor had qualified. There can be
no question but that the people have the right to elect the
Chief of the Bureau of Statistics at the general State elections
provided for by Sec. 4678, Rev. Stat., I881.
In determining the right of the people to elect a State officer
and the appointing power of the Governor, we limit what we
have said to offices of the nature and character of the one in
question. There may be a class of officers, and probably is,
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whose duties are not general, or relate to and are calculated to
aid the Governor in the execution of the laws, or police officers
whom the Governor would have the right to appoint, but in
regard to his right to appoint such officers we decide nothing.
The conclusion we reach is, that the General Assembly had
no power to elect the appellee to the office in question, and
that such election was void; that the information alleges there
was a vacancy in the office; that the appellee usurped the
office and illegally held possession of it; that the Governor
appointed the relator, and he was eligible and is entitled to the
office. The Court below erred in sustainiig the demurrer to
the information.
The judgment is reversed at the costs of the appellee and the
cause remanded to the. Court below, with instructions to overrule the demurrer and for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.
ELLioTT and

MITCHELL,

JJ., dissent.

ELIuoTT, C. J.: I dissent from the prevailing opinion, for the
reason that I believe the Legislature has power, and that, having power to do this, it has also the right to select the means
and agencies which it deems necessary to carry into effect the
law it has enacted, establishing that bureau. I have stated my
views in the opinion in the case of State v. Hyde [decided November 7, 1889], and I do not deem it necessary to again discuss the question.
[The views of the dissenting judge
can be understood from this quotation
from his opinion in the case alluded
to--" If the power to appoint is exclusively executive, the provisions of
our Constitution expressly designating
the cases in which the Governor may
appoint are meaningless; but the words
of an instrument of such a solemn and
high nature as that of the organic law
of a sovereign state cannot be disregarded. Courts have no iight to treat
them as dead-and unmeaning; on the
contrary each word is to be deemed
one of life and strength. Giving force
to the various provisions of the Consti-

tution which designate the cases in
which the Governor may appoint to office, it must be held that he can appoint in no others; for it is a rudimental
principle that the express mention of
one thing implies the exclusion of all
others. * * * If the Governor possesses the power of appointment as
an inherent and exclusive attribute of
executive power, then the many provisions--for there are many of themdesignating the cases in which he may
appoint, are vain and fruitless; since,
if the power is an inherent executive
element, these provisions are utterly
meaningless."
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At the same session of the Legislature at which the Act declared invalid
in the principal opinion was passed,
another Act was passed providing for
cities having over fifty thousand inhabitants, a Board of Control, which should
take charge of the streets and alleys of
the cities, attend to their construction
and repair, employ laborers, and attend
to all necessary work connected therewith. The Common Council was required to provide funds for the expenses
incurred by the Board. All other
Boards of the kind were abolished. The
Legislature, by a joint vote of a majority thereof, elected the members of
the Board, and the Spea-er of the
House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate certified to the
election, which certificate was declared
to be "his authority to act as a member of such Board."
By a divided Court, this Act was declared unconstitutional, one of the
grounds being that it involved the exercise of executive functions which
were prohibited by the Constitution.
"Generally," says the Court in the
principal opinion in that case, "then,
the appointment to an office is an executive function. It must be conceded,
however, that it is not every appointment to office which involves the exercise of executive functions, as, for instance, the appointments made by judicial officers in the discharge of their
official duties, or the appointments made
by the General Assembly of officers
necessary to enable it to properly discharge its duties as an independent legislative body, and the like. Such appointments by the several departments
of the State Government are necessary
to enable them to maintain their independent existence, and do-not involve
an encroachment upon the functions of
any other branch. But the appointment
to an office like the one involved here,
where it is in no manner connected
VOL. XXXVII.-45

with the discharge of legislative duties,
we think involves the exercise of executive functions, and falls within the prohibition of Section x, Article 3, of the
Constitution [that is, that the powers of
the Government are divided into three
separate departments: the legislative,
the executive, including the administrative, and the judicial; and no person.
charged with official duties under one
of these departments shall ex6rcise any
of the functions of another, except as
in this Constitution expresslyprovided].
Referring to the clause of the Constitution that "All officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for in this Constitution shall be chosen.
in such manner as now is, or hereaftermay be, prescribed by law," the Court
said-" This provision is evidently to,
be construed in the light of the laws in
force at the time of its adoption. We
think it would be impossible to ascertain its meaning in any other way.
Other sectiotns of the Constitution make
provision for appointments by the Governor and for certain appointments by
the General Assembly; but there was
still a large number of officers created
by law for whose appointment no provision had been made. In view of thisfact, Section x, Article 15, was inserted,
providing that such officers should be
appointed in such manner as then was,
or as should thereafter be, prescribed by
law. It is disclosed by an examination
of the laws then in force, that tire State
librarian, State printer, Warden of the
State prison at Jeffersonville, Commissioners of the Insane Asylum, and, perhaps, some other officers, for whose appointment no provision is made in the
Constitution, were elected or appointed
by joint ballot of the two Houses of the
General Assembly. This, at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, was
the manner prescribed by law for their
appointment.
This section provides
that they shall continue to be so ap-
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pointed, unless a different mode is prescribed by lw. This construction barand gives force to all the
- monizes
provisions of the Constitution ; while to
"wholly deny the General Assembly the
power to make appointments, renders
meaningless many words, phrases, and
even whole sentences found in that instrument.
But the Court does not rest its opinion wholly upon the argument set out
above. It proceeds to say- "I We think
it plain that the power to provide by
law the manner or mode of making an
.appointment, does not include the power
-to make the appointment itself. As has
tbeen said, by Section I, Article 15, the
General Assembly has the right to appoint such officers as it had the right by
the law in force at the time of its adoption to select, and by the terms of that
section it also has the right to prescribe
by law the manner in which officers, for
whose appointment no provision is made
in the Constitution, shall be appointed.
What, tMen, is the limit of the- legislative power to appoint to office! created
by statute, or is there any limit to such
power? If there is no limit, then the
General Assembly may appoint all the
officers created by statute, from the Attorney-General of the Slate down to the
smallest township officer, for they are
all the creatures of the statute. It may
appoint the Board of County Commissioners, the Township Trustees, County
Superintendents, ant even Road Super-visors. It may create offices without
limit and fill them with its owrn appointees. In the light of contemporaneous history of the Constitution, we do
not think it will be seriously contended
that the framers of that instrument intended to confer upon, or leave with,
the General Assembly any-such power,
Where, then, is the limit ? Whatever
the limit may be, it is clear to us that it
has no power to fill, by appointment, a
local office like the one now under con-
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sideration. As the right to prescribe by
law the manner of appointing to a new
office created by the Legislature does
not carry with it the right to make such
appointment, we know of no provision
in the Constitution under which such
right can reasonably be asserted. It is
believed that this conclusion accords
with the practical construction heretofore placed upon our Constitution :"
State ex rel.Jameson v. Denny (1889),
ix8 Ind. 382.
Upon the'same day the case just
quoted from, was decided, the same
Court also decided another case, involving the same principles. The same
Legislature had appointed a Board for
the control of the Police and Fire Departments of all cities having a population of 29,000 and over; and selected
the members of the Board of Control.
Not only was the appointment held
invalid, but the entire Act, as in the previous case, on the ground that the Act
deprived the cities embraced by it of
local self-control: City ofEvansville v.
State ex rel. Blend (1889), 118 Ind. 426;
State ex rel.Iolt v. Denny (1889), 118
Id. 449 (involving the same questions).
The Constitution ordains that-"It
shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide, by law, for the support of institutions for the education of
the deaf and dumb and of die blind,
and also for the treatment of the insane." It was held that the Legislature
had the right to make the appointments
or the election of a Board of Trustees
for such asylums, under the clause requiring it to provide for the support c f
such institutions. Thejudge who wrote
the principal opinion thought that the
clause thai-" All officers, whose appointment is not ctherwise provided for
in this Constitution, shall be chosen in
such manner as now is, or hereafter may
be, prescribed by law "-controlled the
case, and empowered the Legislature to
elect or make the appointment; but
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three of the judges, while concurring in
the general result, apparently did not
join in this part of the opinion, unless,
possibly, it was ELLIo'ir, J.
MITCHELL, J., said-" The Constitution provides specifically the manner in
which certain officers are to be chosen.
With reference to those not therein provided for, it directs that they shall be
chosen as may be prescribed by law.
That was the command of the people
concerning a right inherent in them. If
the original law of the State were silent
concerning the method of selecting officers whose appointments were not
otherwise provided for in the Constitution, it would then be necessary in each
ca-e to solve the question by construction, and by considering whether the
duty or power in each particular case
pertained to the legislative, the executive, or the judiciary. But, confining
ourselves strictly to the case before the
Court, we assert that the power to appoint agencies for the government of
the hospital for the insane is not left to
inference, but is expressly conferred
upon the General Assembly. As we
have already seen, the Constitution in
the most explicit terms enjoins upon the
General Assembly the duty to make
provision by law for the support and
maintenance of this institution. The
solemn obligation thus imposed was
laid directly upon that body, and it was
left absolutely untrammeled as to the
means and agencies which it should
em 1" loy in executing the high command
of the people.
"Accepting as correct the proposition
that a law enacted in obedience to, and
in execution of, the express command of
the Constitution, which is not in palpable violation of some express Constitutional provision, is of as high sanction
as though it were found in that instrument, and the further conclusion follows
that the command of the Constitution,
which enjoined upon the General As-

sembly the duty to provide by law for
the support of the benevolent institutions, was equivalent to an express grant
of authority to provide for the selection
of all such agents or officers as that
body should deem necessary to accomplish the duty imposed. Having been
thus authorized, the manner of selecting
the agencies for the government of
these institutions, as provided by the
Legislature, is not now open to question
by any other department of the Government :" Ilovey v. State, decided by
the Supreme Court of Indiana, April
20, 1889.
A former case over the appointment
of trustees for the same place, did not
involve the Coustitutional question presented in the latter case: State ex rel.
Carson v. tlarrison (1888), 113 Ind.
434; Zlovey v. State, S. Ct. Ind., May
x8, 1889.
At the same time the principal. case
was decided, the Court decided State
ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, involving
the saipe question presented by the
principal case. It was decided by a
divided court, the same judges dissenting.
Another case in Indiana is somewhat
illustrative of the general question, especially certain language used by the
Court. In this case there was no division of opinion. The Legislature in
1889 created a Supreme Court Commission, and itself selected the Commissioners. The Supreme Court refused to acknowledge the validity of
the Act.
In discussing the case, ELLIOTT, J.
(who dissented in the principal case),
said: "Counsel for the defendants
refer us to the case of Taylor v.
Corn. (x830), 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 4o,
where it is held that the appointment
to office is intrinsically an executive
function. Other courts have asserted a
like doctrine. Thus it was said in State
v. Barbour(1885), 53 Co1n. 76, that
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! appointments to office, by whomsoever
made, are intrinsically executive acts.'
But if we were to accept this doctrine
as correct, and give it full application,
then it would completely destroy the
claim of the defendants, for if the right
to appoint can never be anything else
than an executive act, the attempt of the
Legislature to appoint the claimants was
utterly abortive. But we do not understand the authorities to assert that the
selection of officers is always an executive act. On the contrary, the authorities hold that, while the power is
intrinsically executive, it may be exercised by a court, or by a legislative
body, as an incidental power of an independent department of the government. No one would, we confidently
assume, be so bold as to assert that the
Legislature may not appoint officers connected with its duties and proceedings,
and there is no more reason for denying
the power to the courts than there is of
denying itto the Legislature. The truth
is that all independent departments have
some appointing power as an incident
of the principal power, for without it no
department can be independent: State
v. Barbour,

supra; Ackley's Case

(1856), 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 35. We
are not here dealing with the general
power to appoint, but we are dealing
with a single phase of the general question, and we do no more than affirm
that each department must have, and
does have, some aplointing power, and
that where an appointnent is essential
to the proper exercise of a judicial duty,
the court concerned has authority to
make the appointment. If this be not
true, then no court can appoint a guardian, an administrator, a receiver, a referee, an appraiser, or a commissioner.
It is in truth impossible to conceive of
the existenc of an independent judicial
department without the power to -make
some appointments. The denial of this
incidental power is the annihilation of

judicial independence :" State ex ret.
Hoey v. Noble (1889), zX8 Ind. 350.
The Constitution of Indiana does not
provide for the election of an AttorneyGeneral. The office was created by
statute in 1855, and the statute creating
it provided that the Legislature should
elect an incumbent who should serve
until the next general election. The
Legislature had failed to elect, and the
Governor claimed the right of appointment, on the ground that there was a
vacancy. The Secretary of State refused
to commission the appointee, and the
Court denied the Governor's right to
make the appointment. The validity of
the statute was not contested; the question being one of construction. Its
validity seems to have been conceded:
Collins v. State (1856), 8 Ind. 344A similar concession seems to have
been made in the case of a director of
the State Prison, who was chosen by the
Legislature: Baker v. Kirk (1870), 33
Ind. 517.
In 1868, a retiring board of the army
reported that a colonel, a breveted
major-general, ought to be retired; the
President retired him, under an Act of
Congress, with the full rank of majorgeneral. Subsequently an Act of Congress attempted to change his retired
rank to that of brigadier-general. While
it was said that appointments to office
could be made only by the executive
branch of the Government in the manner provided by the Constitution, yet
the later Act of Congress only had the
effect to change his rank and not to
changehisoffice: Woodv. U.S. (1879),
15 Ct. Cl. 151.
A letter of Jefferson to Samuel Kerchival, dated-July 12, 1816, has often been
cited upon the point under discussion.
In that letter he said-" Nomination to
offices is an Executive function. To
give it to the Legislator, as we do
[speaking of Virginia], is a violation
of the principle of the separation of
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powers. It swerves the members from
correctness, by tempting to intrigue for
offices themselves, and to corrupt barter
of votes; and destroys responsibility by
dividing it among the multitudes. By
leaving nomination in its proper place,
among executive functions, the principle
of the distribution of power is preserved, and the responsibility weighs
with its heaviest force on a single head."
This letter, and others of Mr. Jefferson, have received attention from the
Supreme Court of California. In that
State the Constitution provided that
"The powers of the Government of the
State of California shall be divided into
three separate departments-the legislative, executive, and judicial ; and no
person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of
these departments shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the
others, except as in this Constitution
expressly directed or permitted." An-other clause in the Constitution provided
that "All officers or commissioners,
whose election or appointment is not
provided for by this Constitution, and
all officers or commissioners whose
offices or duties may hereafter be created
by law, shall be elected by the people,
or appointed, as the Legislature may
direct." The Legislature passed a law
providing for a board of trustees to control the State Library, and that such
trustees should be selected by the Legislature in joint convention assembled.
This Act was held valid. Commenting
on Jefferson's letters, the Court said"INo doubt these views as to the intrinsic nature of the power of appointment or of nomination to office, and of
the expediency of confining it to the
executive department of the Government, are entitled to the highest consideration; but the question here is not
what the Constitution ought to be, but
what it is, or, in other words, what was
the intention of its framers as to this

particular matter? Of course, if there
had been at the time of its adoption a
general consensus of opinion in harmony with the views of Mr. Jefferson,
we should be forced to conclude that its
framers intended to forbid to the Legislature the exercise of the power of
appointment to office, but there was no
such consensus of opinion. On the
contrary, it had not only been decided
in other States of the Union, under Constitutions containing provisions substantially equivalent to the sections above
quoted from our own, that the Legislature could fill offices by itself created,
but our own Supreme Court, construing
provisions of our old Constitution, had
come to the same conclusion :" People
v. Freeman, S. Ct. Cal., Aug. 30, 1889.
Accordingly it was held that the
Legislature could appoint a physician
for the State Insane Asylum: People v.
Langdon (1857), 8 Cal. i. So, People
v. Fitch (x851), I Id. 519, an instance
of appointment by the Legislature of a
State printer.
In Maryland, it was held that the
Legislature could appoint to an office,
even taking that power from the Governor, when it had created the office,
and expressly authorized or tacitly allowed him to fill it by appointment.
MAsoN, J.,said that Article 2, Section ii, of the Constitution, provides
"that the Governor shall appoint all
officers 'whose appointment or election is not otherwise herein provided
for, unless a different mode of appointment be prescribed by the law creating the office.' In few words, we
think this provision means, simply, that
the Governor shall have the power to
fill all offices in the State, whether
created by the Constitution or by Act of
the Assembly, unless otherwise provided
by one or theother. * * * * The office
we are now considering is one of legislative creation; and by the Legislature
it can be modified, controlled, or abol-

STATE ex

rel. WORRAL

ished; and within these general powers
is embraced the right to change the
mode of appointment to the office. We
have only to add that as the Legislature
has the power to withdraw the authority
to appoint from the Governor, the mode
pointed out by the Act of 1854, by which
the inspectors under that Act were to be
designated and qualified, was a constitutional exercise of legislative power,
and we need not say whether the inspectors, under the Act of 1854, are technically officers in point of law or not :"
Davis v. State (1854), 7 Md. '5'.
In Missouri, the appointment by the
Legislature was upheld, but the statute
was not questioned. It was a matter
of construction: State v. Laisk (1853),
I8 Mo. 333.
In Nivada, the Legislature incorporated the town of Carson, and appointed
the Board of Trustees for the first year.
It was contended that the act of appointment was void. A provision almost
identical with the provision in the Indiana Constitution was in the Constitution of Nevada; that is, dividing the
powers of the government into three
departments, and excluding all persons
charged with authority under one from
exercising it under either of the remaining two. The Governor was authorized
to fill-any office which, from any cause,
should "become vacant, and no mode"
was "provided by the Constitution and
laws, for filling such vacancy, * * by
granting a commission," which expired
at the next election and qualification of
the person elected to such office, for the
provision was that "All officers whose
election or appointment is not otherwise
provided for, shall be chosen or appointed as may be prescribed by law."
The constitutional provision referred to
was held not to apply to the officers
selected, and that the Legislature had
full power to make the appointments:
Statev. Rosenstock(1876), it Nev. 128.
A like decision was made by the same
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Court, where the Legislature had selected couity officers for a newly created
county, by a clause inserted in the Act
creating the county. In such an instance
it was deemed that there was no vacancy
for the Governor to fill; for at the instant
the office came into existence, it was
filled, and not vacant : State v. Irwin
(1869), 5 Nev. Iii.
In New York, a statute provided that
no committee or member of the Common Council of a city, should "perform
any executive business whatever, except
as is or shall be especially imposed on
them by the laws of this State, and except that the Board of Aldermen may
approve or reject the nominations made
to them as hereinafter provided." A
subsequent act authorized the Council
to elect or appoint a Commissioner of
Deeds for the city, and this act was
held valid: Acley's Case (1856), 4
Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 35.
In New York, the Constitution provided that all city, town and village
officers, apd all county officers, should
be elected in a certain way; and "all
other officers, whose election or appointment is not provided for by this Constitution, and all officers whose office may
heteafter be created by law, shall be
elected by the people, or appointed as
the Legislature may direct." The Legislature created a Board of Education
and selected the trustees for it, and this
action was held authorized by the Constitutional provision quoted: Peoplev.
Bennett (1867), 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 480See People v. Draper (1857), 15 N. Y.
532; Peple v. Albertson (1873), 55
Id. 50.
In North Carolina, the Constitution
provided that "The Governor shall
nominate, and, by and with the advice
and consent of a majority of the Senators elect, appoint all officers whose
offices are established by this Constitution, which shall be created by law, and
whose appointments are not otherwise
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provided for, and no such officer shall
be appointed or elected by the General
Assembly."
It was held that the
words, "whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for," meant "provided for by the Constitution," and the
words, "no such officer shall be appointed or elected by the General Assembly," were added as an express veto
upon the power of the General Assembly
to appoint or to elect an officer, whether
the office was established by the Constitution or was created by an act of the
General Assembly. Therefore, an act
attempting to vest in the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives all the power
vested in the Governor to appoint a
proxy, or proxies, or directors, to represent the interest of the State in any corporation, or company, in which the
State had an interest, was held void;
because it created a new office, took
from the Governor his constitutional
right of appointment, and placed the
appointment in the Legislature; contrary to the express veto of the Constitution: State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley
(1872), 66 N. C. 59.
So, an Act of the Legislature, vesting
in that body the appointment of Trustees
of the State University, Directors of the
Penitentiary, of the Lunatic Asylum,
and of the Institution for the Deaf and
Dumb and tile Blind, was void: People
ex re. Wlker v. Bledsoe (1873), 68 N.
C. 457; Peopleex rel.Nicholsv. AcKee
(1873), 68 Id. 429; University R. R.
Co. v. Holden (1869), 63 Id. 410.
Section 27, Article 2, of the Constitution of Ohio, is as follows: "The
election and appointment of all officers,
and the filling of all vacancies not otherwise provided for by this Constitution,
or the Constitution of the United States,
shall be made in such manner as may
be directed by law; but no appointing
power shall be exercised by the General
Assembly4, excpt as prescribed in this
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Constitution, and in the election of
United States Senators; and in these
cases the vote shall be taken viva voce."
And Section 2 of Article 7 contained
this clause: "The directors of the penitentiary shall be appointed or elected in
such manner as the General Assembly
may direct."
It will be noticed that the first half of
the section and the second section
quoted are similar, in legal effect, to
Section i of Article 15 of the Constitution of Indiana. In other words, these
provisions left it to the General Assembly to direct the manner of making certain appointments.
After speaking of the claim of the
Legislature to appoint, BRINKERHOFF,

J., said: "To make good this claim, it
must be made to appear that the pi)wer
to direct the 'manner,' the mode, the
way in which an act shall be done, and
the power and authority to do the act
itself, are one and the same thing. But
that they are not identical, or equivalent
to each other, is too clear for argument,
and almost too clear to admit of an
illustration. To prescribe the manner
of election or appointment to an office
is an ordinary legislative function. To
make an appointment to office is an
administrative function. And under a
constitution in which the philosophical
theory of a divizion of the powers of
government into legislative, executive
anid judicial should be exactly carried
out in detail, the power of prescribing
the manner of making appointments to
office would fall naturally and properly
to the legislative department; while the
power to make the appointments themselves would fall as naturally and properly to the executive department. This
exact adherence to theory, however, is
seldom, if ever, found in any frame of
government, and we refer to the distinction simply by way of reply to the
claim, on behalf of defendants, in argument, that the power to prescribe the
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manner of appointments includes the
power of appointment itself,and to show
that they are acts and powers wholly
different and distinct from each other:"
tate ex re. v. Kennon (1857), 7 Ohio
St 546.
SwAN,J,, in the same case (at p. 570)
used the following language: "Upon
this question it seems to me only necessary torefer to the plain words of the
Constitution. * * * * Now, providing
by law the manner in which an appointment shall be made, and making the
appointment itself, are two different
things. The first is pointing out the
mode in which a thing shall be done,
and the other is doing the thing itself.
The one is legislative and directory;
the other, administrative."
It was therefore held that the Legisislature had no appointing power, and
-could not select commissioners of the
State House, who were to complete it;
mor directorsof the State Prison: State.
ex rel.v. Kenxon (1857), 7 Ohio St.
546.
The Constitution of Oregon provides
-I"The chief executive power of the
State shall be vested in a Governor."
Another provision, dividing the Governxnent into three separate departments, is
almost identical with the section quoted
from the California Constitution. Another clause provided-" When, during
a recess of the Legislative Assembly, a
vacancy shall happen in any office, the

appointment of which is vested in the
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Legislative Assembly, or when, at any
time, a vacancy shall have occurred in
any other State office, or in the office of
judge of any court, the Governor shall
fill such vacancy by appointment, which
shall expire when a successor shall have
been elected and qualified." The Legislature appointed railroad commissioners, and the act authorizing the appointment was upheld. The Court
said-" Now if it could be shown that
the power to appoint all officers which
are not made expressly elective by the
people, is a part of the chief executive
power of the State, the appellant's contention would be sustained; but no authority whatever has been cited to sustain this view, nor is it believed any
exists; on the contrary, the provisions
of the fifth article of the Constitution,
which relattes to the executive department, all seem at variance with this
view. The framers of this instrument
evidently designed that no prerogative
power should be left lurking in any of
its provisions. No doubt they remembered something of the history of the
conflicts of the prerogative in that
country from which we inherited the
common law:" Brims v. McBride,
S. Ct..Or., June 20, 1889. See a similar
decision in State v. Lusk (1853), I8
Mo. 332, where there was a Constitutional provision like the California provision.
W. W. THORNTON.
Indianapolis, Ind.

PEOPLE V. LEE CHUCK.

Supreme Court of California.
PEOPLE v. LEE CHUCK.
Under the California Code of Civil Procedure ( 2052), when it is sought to
impeach a witness, by asking him what he said at a former trial, he must first be
shown his former statements, if reduced to writing, and have them read to him, if
he is not acquainted with the language in which they have been written.
The mere absence of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the
accused.
It is error, on a criminal trial, to argue, at the same time, for the admission of
evidence and also for its effect if admitted: such conduct unduly prejudices the
jury. This rule is the same, at whatever stage of the trial such arguments are used.
Where the jury, in a criminal case, after being charged and after retiring, and
before agreeing upon a verdict, indulge in wine and cognac, even in a moderate
degree, their verdict will be set aside.

In banC. Appeal from Superior Court of the city and county
of San Francisco.
George A. Knight and H. H. Lowenthtal,for appellant.
George A. Johnson, Att'y-Gen., for appellee.
WORKS, J., March 5, 1889. The appellant was charged,
tried, and convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree,
and sentenced to death. He moved the Court below for a
new trial, which was denied, and now prosecutes this appeal.
Several grounds for reversal are urged, which may be
grouped and considered as follows(i) Alleged erroneous rulings of the Court below on the admission and exclusion
of evidence.
(2) Misconduct of the District Attorney.
(3) Misconduct of one of the jurors in visiting and inspecting certain premises
during the trial, unaccompanied by the officer of the Court, and without leave.
(4) Misconduct of the jury in drinking intoxicating liquors while deliberating
upon their verdict.
(5) Error in the instructions of the Court.

The evidence is not all in the record. The bill of exceptions
recites, substantially, that there was evidence tending to show
that the appellant shot and killed one Yen Yuen, on one of the
streets of the city of San Francisco; that he attempted to
escape; was followed by an officer, whom he also attempted
to shoot; was arrested, and found to be armed with four revolvers, and protected by a coat of mail, made of links of steel,
worn under his clothing; that at the time of the shooting he
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was accompanied by several other persons, who also ran away
immediately afterwards; that the deceased had a pistol on his
person which was fully loaded, none of the chambers havirfg
been discharged. There is no general statement showing what
the defendant proved in his defense, or its tendency.
i. During the cross-examination of one Chow Hin, a witness
for the prosecution, he was asked by the defense how long he
had known the defendant. He answered"Several years ago, because it was on last year six months 28 day that he killed
Yen Yuen, and I knew him about a year before that."

The defendant moved the Court to strike out so much of
the answer as referred to the killing of Yen Yuen by the defendant, on the ground that it was not responsive to the question. The motion should have been sustained, but, as the
record comes to us, we cannot say that any injury could have
resulted from the ruling of the Court. The killing of the deceased by the defendant may have been, and we infer from the
matters appearing in the record was, an undisputed, though
perhaps not an admitted, fact, the defense being that the killing
was justifiable. If so, the statenient of the witness was harmless.
The same witness was asked whether he did not testify to
certain things before the Police Court, and answered that he
did; whereupon the prosecution asked him whether he did
not at the same time make certain other statements. To this
the defendant objected, and the objection was overruled, but
there is nothing in the record to show that the question was
answered by the witness. To render a ruling, in favor of the
admission of evidence, material, the record must show that the
question objected to was answered, thereby carrying the objectionable evidence to the jury. It is unnecessary, therefore,
for us to determine whether the evidence that might have been
elicited, was competent or not.
The defense, on cross-examination of one Sorr Sinn, asked
whether he did not, on a former trial of this case, make certain
statements, when the following occurredThe district attorney objected on the authority of People v. Ching H,zg Chang

(1887), 74 Cal' 389, holding that whatever the witness might have said at the
former trial, he had the statutory right to have it presented to him, and read, if in
writing.
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I'he Court remarked to counsel for defendant: "I would sustain you if I could
reverse the Supreme Court, but I cannot."

As the rule referred to is well established, and one in every
respect fair and just, it is fortunate that the Court below was
not possessed of the power to reverse it. There was no error
in this ruling.
The bill of exceptions recites"Evidence having been introduced by the prosecution, tending to show that Lee
Chuck, the defendant, and Quan Gee and Chung Kit and Chung Wye and Chung
Sam were present at, and participated in, the killing of Yen Yuen, the deceased,
the defense then introduced evidence tending to show an alibi for Quan Gee and
Chung Kit, and also tending to show that Lee Chuck and Chung Wye and Chung
Sam were first attacked by Yen Yuen and Chow Hin and others, and that Lee
Chuck and Chung Wye and Chung Sam shot in self-defense at Yen Yuen and his
party-."

The prosecution then proved by the witness, Cox, that he
was an officer; that he had received certain warrants of arrest
for the persons above named, and that he had never been able
to serve two of them, although he had made every effort to
find the parties, and the warrants not served were offered in
evidence, and excluded; but the Court permitted the witness
to testify that he had searched diligently for the parties who
had not been found, and that if he could have found them, he
would have arrested them on the charge set out in them, which
the district attorney had openly stated to the jury was the
same offense for which the defendant was being tried. As to
the other party named, the prosecution was permitted to prove
that he had been arrested where he had been found, several
hours after the shooting, in a small "cubby hole" at the top
of a house near the place of the shooting. The witness was
permitted to testify minutely to the nature of the room, its
furniture, the means of reaching it, with the view, we suppose,
of showing that he was there in hiding to avoid arrest. The
evidence was objected to by the defense on the general grounds
that it was immaterial and incompetent.
For what purpose, or upon what theory, the evidence was
admitted, does not clearly appear. We can only infer it from
the statement of the district attorney, made in support of his
offer, which will be set out hereafter in connection with another
point made. His position, in brief, was, that as to those who
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were not found, it tended to show that they were not innocent
and acting in self-defense, as claimed, or they would not have
run away; and that the fact that they were not present to explain what occurred at the time of the shooting was a circumstance against the defendant, and was "offered to show the
utter improbability of this self-defence fabrication; that is why
this is offered."
There is nothing to show that the defendant was in any way
responsible for their absence, or that he was not as desirous
that they should be present as the prosecution. This is to
permit the act or conduct of one party, after a crime is claimed
to have been committed, indicating his guilt, to be proved as
against another in no way connected with such act or conduct.
We are wholly unable to see upon what rule of law or justice
such a ruling can be upheld.
People v. Sharp (I887), 107 N. Y. 427, is a case in point
There the defendant was charged with bribery. The prosecutor, as a part of his evidence, offered to show by a detective
officer that he was employed to serve subpoenas upon three
other parties, all of whom the district attorney claimed to be
material and competent witnesses, and to show, further, that
the detective was unable to find them in the State, but did find
one of them in Canada, and learned that the others were there,
but did not see them. These persons were named in the
indictment as co-defendants with S1iarp, and the evidence already intended to show that they were mediaries between the
persons offending against the statutes relating to bribery. It
was not claimed by the prosecution, that the defendant was
privy to their absence. The district attorney disclaimed any
intention of proving the flight of those persons as co-conspirators, and so make use of their absence as evidence of guilt, or
an admission of their conduct that the accusation against the
defendant was true, but for the purpose of explaining his inability to produce them as witnesses.
In the case before us, the district attorney openly avowed
that the evidence was offered to disprove the defendant's defense, or, in other words, to prove his guilt. In the case referred
to, the Court says-
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"The evidence already in, was, so far as Sharp was concerned, altogether circumstantial, but tended to show that the persons named, or some of them, were
qualified from actual knowledge, to give evidence bearing more or less directly
upon the very point in issue. We think evidence of their absence was inadmissible. It could have no legitimate bearing upon the issue, and the danger is very
great that such testimony will prejudice a party against whom it is offered. It may
be and frequently is admissible, in answer to evidence from the other side, which
would naturally call for an explanation. But the absence out of the jurisdiction of
the Court, of an associate, or one seemingly connected with the defendant, in the
act charged, is easily construed as evidence of guilt, and, unless the occasion calls
for such proof, it should not be allowed. It is an old maxim that, ' he confesses
the fault who avoids the trial,' but in its application, even to the fugitive, there is
great danger of error. A man may avoid the trial for many motives besides consciousness of guilt, but, however actuated, his conduct can in no degree, in a court
of justice, reflect upon another. Its admission in this case was virtually saying to
the jury-' There is better evidence, and it might be had from the defendant's
associates. It is not the fault of the prosecution that the evidence is not before
you, but because of the voluntary act of those who, with the defendant, stand
charged with the offense.' Thus, the non-production of the witnesses is made to
supply the place of proof of the issue; with that issue, the evidence has no possible
connection. The rule is, that where a party to an issue on trial has proof in his
power which, if produced, would render material, but doubtful, facts certain, the
law presumes against him if he omits to produce that proof, and authorizes a jury
to resolve all doubts adversely to his defense. But the rule cannot be applied,
unless it appears that the proof, whether it is a living witness or paper, is within
his power. It is easy to see that the evidence offered here might be used for an
ulterior purpose, although not pressed by the prosecution, yet entertained and made
effective by the jury, and there certainly could be no presumption that the prosecution had the power to produce any particular witness, certainly not one of those
named, nor did the law require it of them. It is therefore impossible to find any
reason for, or lawful purpose to be gained by, the proof offered, and its admission
was a very dangerous innovation upon the general rule, which excludes it as irrelevant to the issue. * * * Proof even of the absence of these persons was inadmissible. But that was not all. The proof was not only of their absence, but of
unavailing search by a detective, the service of a subpoena upon some of them, and
the failure to obey its mandate. Under the circumstances of the case, the ruling
of the Court in this instance may not have been of much importance, and upon it
alone we should not grant a new trial. But the legal principle which requires
relevant and material evidence, and admits no other, is important; and, however
serious the charge against an accused may be, and however great the evil it uncovers, he cannot properly be made the subject of a judicial sentence, unless the
crime is substantiated acccording to the established rules of evidence."
It will be seen that the evidence improperly admitted was
held not to be of sufficient importance to warrant a reversal of
the case, but it must be borne in mind that the evidence there
was not offered to prove guilt, while here it was offered for that
purpose, and so went to the jury. Having gone to the jury
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for that purpose, its injurious effect upon the rights of the defendant must be apparent. We hold that this was a fatal error,
for which a new trial should have been granted.
As to the evidence of the arrest of the party who was found
by the officer, it was claimed by the district attorney to have
been competent to disprove an alibi, attempted to be proved
by the defendant. If competent at all for this purpose, the
proof of his presence near the scene of the alleged crime was
all that the prosecution was entitled to. The fact that there
was a warrant for his arrest for the crime for which the defendant was on trial, and that he was found under circumstances
tending to" show that he was in hiding, and seeking to avoid
arrest, were wholly immaterial. But we are quite clear that
it was not competent for that purpose. There is nothing to
show that his whereab6uts tended in any way to establish the
presence of the defendant at the place of the killing, and it appeared that the time, to which the testimony referred, was
several hours after the homicide occurred. It was error to
admit the evidence.
2. It is claimed that the assistant district attorney was guilty
of misconduct which prevented the defendant from having a fair
trial. At the time -thewarrants, above referred to, were offered,
and under discussion, the following proceedings took place"Assistant District Attorney.-The defense set up here is the plea of self-

defense. They claim that Yen Yuen, Chow Hint and other persons, assaulted Lee
Chuck, Chung Sam, and Chung Wye, and under such circumstances that would
make Chow Hin the principal in an attempt to murder-murder by way of lying
in wait, which would be murder in the first degree. We now offer to show that
upon the same day"Attorney for Defendant.-Iobject to the counsel's statement, and as to his offer
of proof. He offered the warrants, and the objection is before the Court.
"Assistant District Atlorney.-I am answering your objection. We offer to
show that upon the same day, the 28th day of July, Chow Hin, who, it is alleged,
picked up Yen Yuen's pistol; Chow Hin, the unsuccessful murderer of Lee Chuck;
and Chow Hin, the peron who will be rated here as a highbinder and a gambler;
Chow Hin went down to the proper police authorities and made complaint against
Chung Sam and Chung Wye, and had warrants issued for their arrest for murder;
that these warrants were placed by the chief of police in the hands of the most
skillful detective in the Chinese quarter.
"Attorneyfor,.Defendant.-I most strenuously object to the statement of counsel
as to the warrants, and what disposition was made of the warrants. He offered
cerlan warrants ag'n't Chung Sam and Chung Wye, and I say it is improper to
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prejudice the jury by speaking of cases-of any other person except the defendant.
The object is to prejudice the minds of the jurors against the defendant.
"The Court.-Proceed.
".4tornef,,r Defendan.-I except to the ruling of the Court on behalf of the
defendant.
"Assistant DistrictAttorney.-I offer to show further that this skillful detective
officer, who has had several years' experience, who has had eight or ten years' experience among the Chinese, searched high and searched low, and searched every
Chinese outgoing steamer, which he could search, and has not been able to discover
either Chung Sam or Chung Wye, the innocent attacked parties who were with
Lee Chuck at the time that Yen Yuen and Chow Hin and Fong Fat, and those
other people, made this malicious attack upon them with pistols, on Washington
street. We want to go to the jury on that fact, and we want to ask why these men
are not here. We want to know why they should run away from here; why they
do not make their appearance here, if they were attacked; why these men, who
took part in this conflict, do not come here to this Couft and explain how it was,
of all the people in the world, Chung Sam and Chung Wye, the men who were
with Lee Chuck.
".4tornerforDtfendant.-I protest now, in the name of justice, that the district
attorney be not allowed to proceed in the manner in which he doe.* It is improper
testimony, and an illegitimate manner to produce testimony before the jury.
"A.lssistant District Attorney.-It is not in this view that this testimony is
offered.
".4/torney for Dfndant.-I protest against it, and I want the record to show it.
"Assistant Distri,t Attornc.-It is offered to show the utter improbabilityof this
self-defense fabrication; that is why this is offered."

We have been called upon many times to caution, sometimes
to rebuke, prosecuting officers for the overzealous performance
of their duties. They seem.to forget that it is their sworn duty
to see that the defendant has a fair and impartial trial, and that
he be not convicted except by competent and legitimate evidence. Equally with the Court, the district attorney, as the
representative of law and justice, should be fair and impartial.
He should remember that it is not his sole duty to convict, and
that to use his official position to obtain a verdict, by illegiti-.
mate and unfair means, is to bring his office and the courts into
distrust. We make due allowance for the zeal which is tie
natural result of such a legal battle as this, and for the desire
of every lawyer to win his case, but these should be overcome
by the conscientious desire of a sworn officer of the Court to
do his duty, and not go beyond it.
We regret to say that the assistant district attorney seems
to have failed, in this instance, to apply this salutary check to
his conduct. The evidence he was seeking to have admitted,
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was clearly incompetent. What was said, was not only an
argument in favor of its admission, but as to its effect. The
evident intent was to prejudice the jury against the defendant,
by commenting upon the conduct of others, over whose action
he was not shown to have any control, and that in language,
the impropriety of which is apparent at a glance. The Court
was appealed to time and again to prevent it, but declined to
do so. While we might hesitate to reverse the case on this
ground alone, we hold it to have been error. See, as bearing
on this point, People v. Mitchell (1882), 62 Cal. 411, and cases
cited; State v. Smith (i876), 75 N. C. 3o6.
Questions of this kind usually arise out of the closing arguments of counsel, but the rule must be the same at whatever
stage of the cause the improper language is used.
3. It is claimed that there was misconduct on the part of the
jury, which' entitled the defendant to a new trial. As to the
alleged misconduct of one of the jurors, in visiting and examining certain premises, unattended by an officer, and alone, it
was not made one of the grounds for a new trial, and for that
reason cannot be considered here.
The grave charge is, that the jury drank intoxicating liquors
while they were deliberating upon their verdict. The affidavits
show, beyond question, that the case was given to the jury at
3.35 o'clock in the afternoon; that they had failed to agree at
the hour of 6.30, when they were taken, in charge of a deputy
sheriff and bailiff, to a restaurant for dinner; that they were
served with a "French dinner," and, with other refreshments,
partook of a half dozen quart bottles of claret wine and a half
bottle of cognac, the latter being used as flavoring for their
coffee; that they were about an hour at the restaurant, when
they returned to their room, and within two hours agreed upon
the verdict that was returned into Court. There are affidavits
showing that when they returned from their dinner, their conduct and appearance, or that of some of them, were such as to
indicate that they had been indulging in iritoxicating liquors,
and it is alleged that their having done so resulted in their
agreeing upon the verdict. The two officers in charge make
affidavit that none of the jurors were intoxicated, or gave any
evidence of being in that condition. Each of the jurors makes
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an affidavit, in which he admits that they drank wine, and took
cognac in their coffee, but he does not know how many bottles.
Their affidavits are, we believe, substantially, if not precisely,
alike, and in each it is said"And this affiant further avers that, upon the said occasion, this affiant was not
drunk, or intoxicated, and that this affiant's intelligence and good judgment were
not obscured, or affected in any way, by intoxicating drinks of any character, and,
as far as his observation extended, no one of said jury became drunk, or intoxicated,
upon said occasion, and that the intelligence and good judgment of no one of said
jury became, or was obscured, by intoxicating drinks upon said occasion;" and,
further, "that he, for himself, did not find any such verdict against the defendant
by reason of partaking of the liquor and wine above mentioned; and this affiant
repels and repudiates the truth of any insinuation that he, or, so far as his observation extended, any of the members of the jury, found any such verdict against the
defendant by reason of partaking of the liquor and wine above mentioned."
I It appears, therefore, that the amount of liquors mentioned
was consumed. Whether it was equally divided-one pint of
the wine to each juror-does not appear. If any juror drank
less, he has refrained from saying so, perhaps out of delicacy
for the feelings of his'associates, who would be convicted
thereby of having taken more.
The learned attorney-general contends that this was not such
misconduct as should reverse the case, because the wine was
"California claret," and the cognac was used as a "flavoring
for coffee." Whether he intends to insinuate that California
claret is too weak to intoxicate, or to claim that to drink wine
of our own make should not be treated as misconduct, does
not appear; nor does he show that cognac is less effective
when adulterated with coffee. The affidavits show that the
wine was intoxicating, and the prosecution introduces the affidavit of the proprietor of the restaurant to show its age, quality,
and'probable effects. He says"Said claret wine was a good quality of California Zinfandel wine, of four years
of age;" and that he has "been engaged in the restaurant business for a period of
ten years past; that he has had great experience with wines, and their effects, and
that he scouts, as foolish and absurd, the idea that twelve full-grown men could be
seriously or at all affected by using, if they did use, six bottles of claret at dinner,
with a little cognac in their coffee afterwards."

It must be conceded that this is some evidence that the
whole twelve could not have been seriously or at all affected,
and perhaps that none of them were so affected, assuming that
VOL. XXXVII.-
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the wine and cognac were equally divided. We are thus led
to consider, at the outset, whether this Court should stop to
inquire what was the effect of the drinking of these liquors.
That the jury drank the liquors is not denied. The sole question raised is, whether the mind of any member of the jury was
so affected thereby as to impair his intelligence or judgment,
or render him less competent to transact, with clearness and
impartiality, the grave duty resting upon him. It is infinitely
more important that the channels of justice be kept pure and
untainted, than that the verdict against this defendant shall be
maintained. The question is not a new one.
In some cases it has been held that for a juror to take a
drink of liquor during the trial, was sufficient ground for granting a new trial. The case before us presents quite a different
question. Here the trial had closed. The life of the defendant
was in the hands of the jury. They were deliberating upon a
question of the gravest consequence to the defendant, to society,
and to themselves. They had, up to the time of partaking of
the liquors, failed to agree, and soon after, agreed upon and
returned a verdict, that, if sustained, must send the defendant
to the gallows. It seems to us that if the fact that the jury
drank intoxicating liquors, without proof that it affected their
minds, or the conclusion reached by them, could be held sufficient to set aside the verdict in any case, no stronger case than
the one before us could be presented. We are of the opinion
that where the proof of the drinking is clear and undisputed,
and that it was done while the jury were actually deliberating
upon their verdict, in a capital case, a verdict of conviction
should not be allowed to stand. This is our conviction, independent of authority, but the great weight of authority is to
the same effect: People v. Gray (1882), 61 Cal. 164, i83;
Leighton v. Sargent (1858), 31 N. H. iI9; Brant v. Fowler
(1827), 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 562; People v. Douglass, (1825), 4 Id.
26; Wison v. Abrahiams (1841), I Hill. (N. Y.) 207; Jones v.
State (1854), 13 Tex. 168; State v. Baldy (1864), 17 Iowa 39;
Ryan v. Harrow (1869), 27 Id. 494; Davis v. State (187), 35
Ind. 496; " State v. Bullard (1844), 16 N. H. 139; Pelham v.
Page (1846), 6 Ark. (i Eng.) 533; Gregg v. McDaniel (1843),
4 Har. (Del.) 367.
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In the case of People v. Douglass,supra, the Court said"It will not do to weigh and examine the q~iantity which may have been taken
by the juror, nor the efiect produced."

And in Lzeighton v. Sargent"For the cause that brandy was furnished to the jury, and drank by several of
them, while deliberating upon the cause, after retiring to form their verdict, we
think the verdict must be set aside. The quantity drank was probably small; but
we cannot consent that that fact should make a difference."

So ini State v. Baldy",The parties have a clear right to the cool, dispassionate and unbiased judgment
of each juror, applied to the determination of the issues in the cause; and the use
in any degree of that which stimulates the passions, and has a tendency to lessen
the soundness of judgment, is itself conclusive evidence that the party, who has
the right to the exercise of that dispassionate judgment, has been prejudiced in not
having it as perfect as it existed in the juror when accepted, applied to the deter
ruination of the cause. If this is true as a general rule, and as applicable to civil
cases, a fortioriis the rule applicable in criminal cases, and especially in this case,
in which the offense charged involves obedience to passions stimulated more than
others by the use of spirituous liquors, and, of course, in its correct determination,
requiring the most careful guarding against undue influence from them."

And, in Davis v. State, it is said-

I

"The bailiff, we may presume, had been sworn, in the usual form, to take charge
of the jury, and keep them together without meat or drink, water only excepted,
etc. The jurors had taken upon them an oath, well and truly to try the cause, etc.,
and had been solemnly sent out to deliberate upon questions involving the life of
an unfortunate fellow-being. If misbehavior, such as that shown by the affidavits,
and which is without attempted palliation or justification, should not be regarded as
sufficient to set aside the verdict, it would be a stigma upon the law and a disgrace
to the courts. We do not mean to say that the Court should enter upon the question as to how far such conduct was or was not excusable or innocuous. It will be
time to decide that question when it shall come up. In this case it does not arise.
We concede that on this point the authorities are not uniform. But as to the sufficiency of such misbehavior, unexplained, to set aside the verdict, the authorities
are abundant and satisfactory."

Also in State v. Bullard",There had indeed been other acts of misconduct in the case, hut we think that
the old law, forbidding the use of refreshments at all to jurors deliberating upon a
verdict, although relaxed materially from its early severity, has not yet so far yielded
as to exempt them wholly from the control of the Court in this particular. And
we are of the opinion that the use of stimulating liquors by a jury deliberating upon
a verdict in a criminal case, without first showing a case requiring such use, and
procuring leave of Court for that purpose, is a sufficient cause for setting aside a
verdict found against the prisoner in such circumstances, whether the use was an
intemperate one or otherwise."
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The respondent cites the following authorities not already
referred to, as opposed to the doctrine that the mere fact that
the jury drank intoxicating liquors, is sufficient to set aside the
verdict, without a showing that it did or might have affected
the result: Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 3; People v. Williams
(1864), 24 Cal. 31; People v. Brannigan (1863), 21 Id. 339;
People v. Symonds (1863), 22 Id. 349; People v. Dannis (187o),
39 Id.625; People v. Turner (1870), Id. 370; People v. Anthony
(I88o), 56 Id. 397; People v. Lyle, decided Sup. Ct. Cal., October 31, 1884; I Bish. Crim. Proc., §'999; State v. Caulfield
(1871); 23 La. An. 148; Davis v. People (1857), 19 II. 74;
Thontpson's Case (185 1), 8 Grat. (Va.) 657; Statev. U-,ton (i855),
20 Mo. 397; Rozwe v. State (1851), 1I Humph. (Tenn.) 491;
Roman v. State (1877), 41 Wis. 312; Westmoreland v. State
(1872), 45 Ga. 225; Kee v. State (1873), 28 Ark. 155; Russell
v. State (1876), 53 Miss. 382.
We have given these authorities our careful attention, and
find that, while they support the general rule that misconduct
of the jury should not avoid a verdict unless it appears to have
injured the complaining party, in our judgment they do not
shake the well-established and salutary rule above laid down,
when applied to a capital case, where the misconduct occurred
while the jury were actually deliberating upon their verdict.
Section I181 of the Penal Code,'relied upon by the respondent, provides (subdivision 3) that a new trial may be granted
to the defendant,,
When the jury has separated without.leave of the Court, after retiring to deliberate upon their verdict, or being guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and due
consideration of the case has been prevented."

It is urged upon us that the section referred to, sets forth
and limits the kind of misconduct for which a new trial may
be granted, and that to authorize the setting aside of thelverdict it must affirmatively appear that a fair and due consideration of the case is prevented. Such a construction of the
statute would compel a defendant, in every case of this kind,
to show Affirmatively that he had been actually injured by the
misconduct complained of. None of the cases cited go to that
extent, and if they did, we should not be inclined to follow
them. That the jury in this case was guilty of misconduct, we
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presume none will deny. The wrongful act committed was
one the direct tendency and natural consequence of which was
to affect their capacity to perform their duties. Such being
the nature of the misconduct complained of, and the act being
committed at the most critical time in the trial, when a cool
head and unclouded brain was so essential to the preservation
of the rights of the defendant, to allow the verdict to stand,
could not, in our judgment, be justified by any rule of law,
reason, or justice.
Of the many cases cited by respondent, there is but one
where the punishment was death, and in none of them was
the liquor drank while the jury were deliberating upon their
verdict. In most, if not all of them, it is conceded that the
act was reprehensible, and should be punished; but they say
that as the act was committed at a time during the progress
of the trial, when it affirmatively appeared that no injury could
have resulted, the verdict should not be disturbed. Thus, in
Russeltv. State (1876), 53 Miss. 382, the Court said"No cause can be more baneful to the purity of a verdict than the use of intoxicating drinks by the jury while engaged in their -deliberations. Nothing can be
more revolting to a sense of justice, or of decency, than the idea of the life, or
liberty, of a citizen depending upon the maudlin deliberations of drunken jurors.
The parties in a civil suit, and a fortiori the defendant in a criminal prosecution,
have the right to demand that the case shall be tried, not only by jurors who are
not drunk, but by men whose minds are not even influenced or clouded by liquor.
Intoxicating liquors as a beverage, therefore, should be rigidly and carefully excluded from the'jury-room; and, if absolutely necessary for medical purposes,
smhould be administered only in small portions, upon the prescriptibn of a physician,
and under the sanction of the judge. But, while the introduction of such liquors
in any other manner, is highly censurable, and should be the subject of exemplary
punishment, it will not vitiate the verdict, if it can be affirmatively shown not to
have injuriously affected the deliberations of the jury. The trial lasted five days.
The liquor was given to the jury on the night of the second and early in the morning of the third day. The State had not then closed its testimony in chief, nor the

defendant commenced his. The quantity of liquor was small, and a portion of
the second supply was drunk. Several of the jury are proved to have been affected
by the spoilt beef, and it is stated that a number of them partook of the liquor.
The quantity was therefore presumably insufficient to have seriously affetted the
minds of any of them. In addition, it was received at night and early in the
morning, some hours before they were called upon in Court to listen to testimony,
and two days before they retired to consider their verdict. Lastly, it is proved
that, ' their conduct during the whole trial was marked by great dignity, decorum,
and propriety.' Under these circumstances, we think it may be fairly said that it
has been affirmatively shown that the verdict was not affected by the liquor."
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In the case of People v. Lyle, supra, this Court said"The legal presumption is that jurors perform their duty in accordance with the
oath they have taken: People v. Wtlliams (x864), 24 Cal. 31 ; and that presumption is not overcome by proof of the mere fact that during a trial, which lasted
over thirty days, two or three of the jurors, after the adjournment of the Court for
the day, drank a few glasses of liquor at the expense of the District Attorney;
that one of them partook of a dinner at the house of the same officer, under circumstances which render the act of invitation necessary, and of a supper at the
hotel of his associate counsel, under like circumstances. - Such acts, however improper or indiscreet, could not, in themselves, have affected the impartiality of any
one of the jurors, or disqualified him from exercising his powers of reason and
judgment, and they will not warrant a Court in setting aside a verdict. 'While
the law,' says Chief Justice SHARKEY, ' is rigidly vigilant in guarding and preserving the purity of jury trials, yet it will not, for light or trivial causes, impugn the
integrity of juries, or question the solemnity and impartiality of verdicts ' : Hare
v. State (1839), 4 How. (Miss.) 187. It is the settled rule that to warrant the
setting aside of a verdict and granting a new trial, upon the ground of irregulfrities and misconduct of a jury, it must be either shown as a fact, or presumed as a
conclusion of law, that injury resulted from such mLconduct. When it is clear
that the party against whom the verdict has been found, was not injured by the
misconduct, the verdict will not be disturbed."

It must be conceded that this case supports the contention
of the respondent, but the facts are so different that it should
have but little weight; and so far as it declares, in general
terms, that to warrant the setting aside of a verdict, and granting a new trial, upon the ground of misconduct of a jury, it
must be either shown as a fact, or presumed as a conclusion
of law, that injury resulted from such misconduct, it is not in
harmony with the cases on the question before us, nor does it
coincide with our views on the subject, when applied to the
circumstances of this case. In the case of People v. Gray
(1882), 6i Cal. 164, i86, (decided by the Court in banc., all of
the Justices concurring,) it was said"It should be added here that, if it is necessary that intoxicating liquors of any Q
kind should be drank by a juror, application for leave to do so should be made to
the Court, who can make such allowance as will be proper. Jurors should not be
allowed to judge for themselves in this matter. A defendant in a criminal case
should not be called on to consent; and in any case when the party consents, if
the juror becomes intoxicated, the verdict should not stand. The purity and correctness of the verdict should be guarded in every way, that the administration of
justice shouldnot be subjected to scandal and distrust."

And it was there held that liquors furnished the jury were
not suitable food, such as they were allowed to have by section
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1136 of the Penal Code. The court below should have granted
the defendant a new trial on this ground.
4. The appellant complains of one of the instructions of the
court, in which it was attempted to define the right of selfdefense. This instruction, taken alone, may be subject to
criticism; but, taking the instructions as a whole, we think
the law on that point was fully and fairly stated.
5. The appellant asked leave of the court to cross-examine
the parties who filed affidavits in support of the verdict of the
jury, which was denied, and this is urged as error. The
defendant was not entitled to such cross-examination as a
matter of right. The court might, in its discretion, have
allowed it, but the refusal to do so was not error.
Judgment and order reversed, and cause remanded for a
new trial.

We concur:

THORNT6N, J.; SHARPSTEIN, J.

BEA=Tn, C. J. I concur in the judgment and in the opinion
of Mr. Justice WORKS, except upon one point. It appears that
after the case had been submitted to the jury, and they had
been for three or four hours deliberating of their verdict, they
were by direction of the court sent in custody of two sworn
officers to dinner. They were taken by the officers to a public
French restaurant, where, in accordance with the invariable
custom of the place, they were served with six quart bottles
(a half bottle each) of California claret, which they consumed
with their dinner, and a small modicum of brandy, which they
used with their coffee. In other words, they had, under the
sanction of the court, and in the presence and custody of its
officers, an ordinary dinner, in a respectable house, embracing
only the usual concomitants of that meal at that place. As to
whether the jurors were at all affected by the wine and brandy
so partaken, the affidavits were conflicting, but certainly there
was ample evidence to warrant the judge of the superior court
in finding that none of them were affected; and unless we are
warranted in holding, as mere matter of law, that any drinking
of wine by a jury, after retiring for deliberation, however
moderate, and whether sanctionid by the trial court or not, is
misconductper se, or unless we can find as matter of fact that
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men who use wine and brandy in the manner and to the extent
these jurors did, and as thousands of men do every day without impeachment of their sobriety or decorum, are thereby
necessarily deprived of their ordinary judgment and discretion,
we cannot say that this jury was guilty of misconduct, or the
defendant prejudiced in this particular. There is, it seems to
me, a clear distinction in principle between this case, in which
the jurors did, openly and without attempt at concealment,
what was apparently, if not expressly, authorized by the trial
court, and that class of cases in which jurors have themselves
clandestinely conveyed intoxicating liquors into the jury-room,
or where, with their connivance, it has been smuggled in by
other unauthorized persons. In such cases the means of procuring the liquor amounts in itself to grave misconduct, and
evinces a total disregard on the part of the jurors of their
obligations and of the rights of the parties. By reason of this
distinction, we are not, in my opinion, constrained by the
authoriti~s to hold, and I am unwilling to say that the jury in
this case was guilty of misconduct.
I dissent: MCFARLAND, J.
The proper rule of conduct and qualification of jurors must vary with the
age and civilization in which they live.
In all times there has been a severer
rule applied to the conduct of the juror
after he had retired to deliberate upon
his verdict than during the hearing of
the cause. The tendency of modem
times has been to equalize this rule by
allowing more privileges to the juror
after he has received the charge of the
Court, and less during the continuance
of the trial.
The ancient English rules never were
in force in the United States, and in the
application of the rule, to the drinking
of intoxicating liquor by a juror, there
is considerable conflict among the
American courts.
Some of these courts hold that no
mratter who furnishes the liquor, or the
amount taken, it will be sufficient to set
aside the verdict; others, that it is only

when it has affected the juror, or when
it is given by the prevailing party, that
the verdict is set aside.
The State v. Broussard(January 21,
1889), decided by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, is another recent case. Here
it appeared that the case was given to the
jury at 6 P. M., and that a verdict was
reached at ii A. M. next morning; and
that during that time the jury was served
with two pint bottles, and about four
six-ounce bottles of whiskey, the greater
part of which was actually consumed by
only two members of that body. The
evidence did not show by whom the
liquor was furnished or supplied, or
that it was done under the orders, or
with the consent or approval of the
trial judge, and it was not shown that
any of the members were or became
intoxicated from the use of the liquors
thus consumed; but it was shown that
in the morning, between daylight and
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ii o'clock, two members of the jury
together drank and consumed a pint
and a half of whiskey, after which
they became sick, and were unable to
partake of any breakfast, and that they
were in that condition at the very moment that the verdict was agreed upon.
In the opinion in this case the Court
says: "We are constrained to believe
that the absorption of so much intoxicating liquor on empty stomachs, after
a night of discomfort, by these two
jurors, must have had an injurious effect
on their minds, and that it was the immediate cause of the sickness which
they then felt. Under the facts in the
record, and in view of the amount of
the intoxicating liquor imbibed by these
two jurors, we have no hesitation in
holding that they, at least, were not in
a condition to exercise the cool and
dispassionate judgment which the law
expects of every juror in deliberating
over a cause involving the life or the
liberty of a fellow-being, and that as a
consequence, the accused has not had a
trial by twelve men "good and true,"
as the law contemplates. * * * * It
would be difficult to formulate or prescribe an inflexible limit to the practice,
(of allowing jurors to drink intoxicants)
and courts can do no more than guard
against excesses in determining such
questions. But the circumstances of
this case disclose an outrageous abuse
of the privilege which no court will
sanction or tolerate."
The case of Ryan v. Harrow(1869),
27 Iowa 494, was an earlier decision,
holding that the drinking of intoxicating liquor by the jurors, after they had
retired to consider their verdict, irrespective of the fact whether they were
under its influence, is sufficient to set
aside the verdict. In this case the liquor
was procured without the aid or knowledge of any of the parties to the action.
BECK, J., said: "Doubtless ardent
spirits, to a certain extent, may be rank

without inflaming the passions or beclouding the reason, but, beyond a certain limit, they indisputably produce
these results. Where that limit is with
different men cannot be certainly known.
Courts will not assume to determine the
limit, and whether, in a case where jurors
have indulged in the use of the dangerous liquid, it has been passed. Inasmuch as, in such a case, there can be
no certainty of the purity and correctness of the verdict, that it is the result
of cool and dispassionate deliberation
and the honest exercise of reason, it
will be set aside. In the business affairs
of the country these very reasons often
constrain those who employ men to discharge duties requiring coolness, deliberation and the calm exercise of the
judgment for their performance with
safety to life and property, to impose
strict abstinence from intoxicating beverages upon those so employed.
"Engineers upon railroad locomotives,
pilots upon steamboats, etc., etc., are
often the subjects of such restrictions;
not because indulgence in intoxicating
liquors, within the very indefinite bounds
of what is called moderation, would absolutely unfit them for the discharging
of their duties, but because it is absolute certainty of perfect safety from the
maddening influence of alcohol, in the
entire abstinence from the use of all
liquors in which it exists, and without
such abstinence there can be no such
safety."
This was a civil case.
The People v. Gray (x882), 61 Cal.
164, is another of the decisions whi.h
hold that the mere fact that liquor was
drank during the deliberations of the
jury by some of the jurors, without permission of the Court or knowledge of
the defendant, is sufficient to set the
verdict aside.
In the opinion it is said: "It should
be added here that if it is necessary
that intoxicating liquors of any kind
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should be drunk by a juror, application
for leave to do so should be made to
the Court, who can make such allowance as will be proper. Jurors should
not be allowed to judge for themselves
in this matter. A defendant in a criminal case should not be calledto consent,
and in any case where the party consents, if the juror becomes intoxicated,
the verdict should not stand. The
purity and correctness of the verdict
should be guarded in every way, that
the administration of justice should not
be subject to scandal and distrust."
SHARPSTMN, J., in concurring says:
"I think that the introduction of ardent
spirits into the jury room, while the
jury were deliberating upon their verdict, constituted misconductper se."
MyticK, J.: "It requires no argument to show that the beer, wine and
whiskey consumed, was not suitable
and sufficient food."
Some courts seem to make a distinction, in civil and criminal cases.
Thus, in New York, in the case of
WVso v. Abrahams (x84i), i Hill
207, a civil case, it was held that the
verdict should not be set aside, "unless
there be some reason to suspect that
the irregularity may have had an influence on the final result."
However, in People v. Douglass
(1825), 4 Cow. 26, a criminal case, the
rule of Peole v. Gray, was adhered to.
In Texas, the same doctrine was announced in Jones v. The State (1854),
13 Tex. 138. This has, however, been
modified by a code provision as follows:
"Mere drinking of liquor by a juror is
not sufficient ground for granting a new
trial." Under this provision, it was
held in Ri r v. State (October 31,
1888), that without proof that a juror became intoxicated, so as to render it
probable that his verdict was influenced
thereby, the verdict would not be disturbed.
In Jones v. State (1854), 13 Tex.

168, it was said: "Every day's experience must satisfy us that it is impossible
to lay down a rule as to how much can
be drank without impairing the qualification of a juror for discharging the
trust confided in him. Its effects have
been well described by Scotland's most
popular bardInsp-ing, bold John Barleycorn,
What dangers thou canst make us scorn I
WI'tipfeny we fear nae evil,
Wi'usquebae, we'll face the de'il.

"Yes, it is but too true,' that it will
make a man bold and reckless, not
only of consequences personally, but
also of the rights of those whose life
and most valuable interests, property
and reputation are at stake; and its
effect is so very different on different
men, that it would be dangerous in the
extreme to attempt to lay down any
rule by which it could or should be determined, whether a juror had drank
too much or not, and the only safe rule
is to exclude it entirely."
In State v. Bruce (1878), 48 Iowa
530, the Court made a distinction between cases where liquor was drank
during the hearing of the cause, and
where it was drank after the jury had
retired to deliberate on their verdict :
"An examination of the numerous
cases cited in argument, has led us to
the conclusion, that, when the indulgence in intoxicating drinks occurs
during the adjournment, and before the
cause is finally submitted to the jury,
the better rule is, in the absence of
showing a prejudice, that the verdict
should stand, and we think there is no
good reason for making any distinction
between civil and criminal cases in the
application of the rule."
In this case the Court, however, expressly affirms Ryan v. Harrow, 27
Iowa 494 (supra), that when the
drinking is after the jury has retired,
the verdict must be set aside.
In Indiana, in a trial for murder,
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after the jury were charged and put in
the care of a bailiff, the bailiff, with
two of them, went to a liquor and
billiard saloon, where other persons
were drinking and playing billiards,
and the bailiff procured for each of
them a drink of brandy, ginger, wine,
nutmeg and sugar, which they drank,
and which was paid for by one of them.
The evidence showed that the bailiff
asked the saloon keeper if he could fix
up something for said jurors for the
diarrhcea, but it did not appear where
the other jurors were at the time when
the two with the bailiff were in the
saloon. There was no attempt to show
that the jurors were really suffering
from diarrhoa, how much liquor they
drank, what effect it had upon their
fitness to deliberate upon the case, or
in any other way to break the force of
the showing made for the defendant.
The verdict was set aside: Davis v.
State (1871), 35 Ind. 496.
In Missouri, without a code provision,
it is held that even in capital cases, a
verdict will not be set aside where intoxicants have been used by the jury
during their deliberations, "unless it
affected it, or the drink was furnished
by an interested party :" State v. Baber
(881),
74 Mo. 292; State v. West
(1879), 69 Id. 4o.
In Russell v. State (1876), 53 Miss.
382, the Supreme Court, while holding that a verdict would not be set aside
for the reason that intoxicants were
imbibed by the jury, use the following
strong language: "No cause can be
more baneful to the purity of a verdict
than the use of intoxicating drinks by
the jury while engaged in their deliberations. Nothing can be more revolting to a sense of justice and decency,
than the idea of the life or property of
a citizen depending upon the maudlin
deliberations of drunken jurors. The
parties in a civil suit, and afortiori the
defendant in a criminal prosecution,

have the right to demand that the case
shall be tried, not only by jurors who
are not drunk, but by men whose minds
are not even influenced or clouded by
liquor."
In the recent case of Burgess v. Territory (September 15, 1888), the Supreme Court of Montana, in a criminal
case where it was shown that several of
the members of the jury took a single
drink, during the trial, but were not intoxicated and drank nothing after they
retired to deliberate on their verdict, held
the refusal to set aside the verdict was not
sufficient error for a reversal.
In Commonwealth v. Thomplson
(I851), 8 Gratt. (Va.) 637, a medical
witness, being accidentally present at a
hotel where the jury were brought by
the Sheriff to be lodged for the night,
invited some of them to drink, which
they did, but though this was held
highly objectionable, it was not sufficient to set aside the verdict.
In a criminal case in Ohio, during
the consideration of the verdict, it was
shown that about two o'clock in the
night, the Deputy Sheriff went with
one of the jurors to a saloon, where the
juror obtained and drank a glass of
whisky. A new trial was granted for
this and other misconduct of the jury:
Weis v. State (1871), 22 Ohio St. 486.
In a later civil case, in the same
State (Railroad v. Porter (1877), 32
Ohio St. 328),where,during the progress
of the trial, but before the jury had retired to its deliberations, one of the
jurors and one of the counsel for plaintiff below, on their way to their respective lodgings, casually met, and while
passing a saloon, the attorney remarked
that he was tired and thought that he
would take a glass of ale, and asked
the juror if he drank ale. On receiving
an affirmative reply, he invited him to
go in and join him in taking a glass of
ale, which they did, remaining there
about five minutes, drinking but a single
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glass each, during which time, nor at
any time while they were together,
was any allusion made to the case.
The Court said: "The rigor of the
ancient rule in regard to jurors eating
and drinking, the reason for it having
ceased, has passed away. Still, inasmuch as intoxicating drinks may so
easily disqualify them for an intelligent
discharge of their duties, courts are, in
all cases, jealous of their use by jurors;
and some high authorities, refusing to
draw a line short of total abstinence,
have held that the drinking of spirituoui
liquors by a juror, during the progress
of a trial, is sufficient ground for setting
a verdict aside. But, more generally,
the stringency of this rule has been so
far relaxed, that the mere fact of drinking spirituous liquors by a juror in a
civil case, during an adjournment of the
trial,though censurable, is not regarded
as a sufficient reason for overturning a
verdict, unless there be some reason to
suspect it may have had some influence
on the final result of the case; for, other-wise, an innocent party would be punished for the censurable conduct of
another person, which has occasioned
no injury to either party."
In the early case of Comm. v. Roby
(1832), 12 Pick. (Mass.) 519, it was
said by SAsv, C. J., "where the irregularity consists in doing that which may
disqualify the jurors for proper deliberation and exercise of their reason and
judgment, as where ardent spirits are
introduced, then it would be proper to
set aside the verdict, because no reliance can be placed upon its purity and
correctness."
In this case it was held that cider
was not a forbidden article.
A very learned author and able judge
has laid down the following rules as
proper guides for decisions where verdicts are challenged for the reason that
intoxicating liquors have been used by
the jury during the trial :

ist. The mere fact that a jury, pending the trial, or while deliberating on
their verdict, drink intoxicating liquor,
without more, will not be sufficient
ground for a new trial.
2d. It is no ground for a new trial,
that a juror drank a small quantity for
medicinal purposes, while suffering from
real sickness, the quantity consumed not
being sufficient to produce intoxication.
3d. Where drinking of ardent spirits
by a juror is attended with other improper conduct, as where a juror separates from his fellows to drink in a barroom, or where ardent spirits are conveyed to him by one of the parties, a
new trial will be granted.
4th. A new trial will generally be
granted where a juror eats or drinks at
the expense of the successful party.
5th. The jealousy of the courts, that
juries should not be subjected to any
improper influences, is such that, if it
applear that intoxicating liquors have
been introduced into the jury-room, in
a manner, or in quantities, which the
affidavits leave unextplained,there is a
presumption that the jury were improperly influenced thereby, and a new trial
will be granted.
6th. Consent of counsel, or of the
party (where the verdict is in his favor),
will generally estop a party in a civil
case from urging, as ground for a new
trial, that the jurors indulged in ardent
spirits, unless abuse is shown to have
resulted from such indulgence, but not
in cases of felony: 2 Thompson on
Trials, 1933.
The suggestion presents itself, whether
judges ought not to specially charge the
jury to abstain from intoxicants during
the trial, and further, whether it ought
not be made a statutory ground of
challenge against a person that he is
addicted to the habitual use of intoxicants, from serving as a juror at all.
WVr. M. RocKm.
Springfield, Ohio.

